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Abstract 
Understanding air travelers’ values for aviation 
safety is essential to design effective and well-
accepted security measures. This study investigates 
changes in U.S. travelers trade-offs for passenger 
screening objectives using the occurrence of an 
international aviation incident (loss of Malaysian 
Airline Flight 370) as a natural experiment. We also 
examine how alternative screening procedures affect 
trade-offs between equity and safety concerns. 
Results show evidence for an enduring effect of the 
aviation incident on trade-offs between safety and 
other passenger screening objectives. Additionally, 
the use of different procedures to select high-risk 
passengers for enhanced screening altered the 
relative importance of the equity objective. 
Implications for the design of future airport security 
policies are discussed.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Due to heightened public concern over aviation 
safety [1], the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) has proposed and implemented a variety of 
new security procedures at U.S. airports in recent 
years. Whereas numerous initiatives have been 
proposed to make air travel safer, creating an 
effective and well-accepted airport security policy 
has been a challenge for the TSA. This is because the 
evolution of U.S. passenger screening technologies 
and policies has resulted in increasing passenger 
concerns related to conflicting objectives. Employing 
a procedure that maximizes safety will undoubtedly 
increase cost, wait time, and inconvenience. 
Importantly, some of the proposed security measures 
may be perceived to specifically target passengers 
with  characteristics related to known members of 
terrorist organizations. However, the classification of 
high versus low risk passengers for additional 
security scrutiny raises the issue of unequal treatment 
of passengers of different nationality, ethnicity, race, 
sex, age, or religion.  
 
 
 
 
As aviation safety will continue being an ongoing 
public concern, new policies that aim to increase 
safety while enhancing efficiency and maintaining 
public acceptance should take into account U.S. 
travelers’ personal values and willingness to accept 
sacrifices to make air travel safer. Importantly, trade-
offs for safety are likely to evolve in response to 
terrorist threats and screening vulnerabilities. It is 
unlikely that people constantly worry about air travel 
when there has been no incident that highlights risks 
of air travel. Conversely, travelers will be more likely 
to make greater sacrifices for safety when there is a 
direct threat applied to air travel. Surprisingly, there 
has been no study that directly addresses how trade-
offs change over time. The current study addresses 
this lacuna by modeling trade-offs among conflicting 
objectives for passenger screening in commercial 
aviation. In particular, we utilized the disappearance 
of Malaysian Airline Flight 370 to model changes in 
trade-offs for safety over time. 
Because previous policies that aim to increase 
public safety have been criticized on the grounds that 
they violate the constitutional principal of equal 
protection [2], equity appears to be another important 
value that many U.S. travelers wish to protect. 
However, policies that aim to increase safety may 
jeopardize this principle, requiring travelers to trade-
off safety and equity objectives. In addition, different 
security procedures may be interpreted quite 
differently with respect to equity values. For 
example, a randomized search at checkpoint appears 
to be more equitable than a search based on profiling 
based on individual passenger characteristics such as 
nationality, ethnicity, race, sex, age, or religion. 
Thus, how passengers are selected for greater 
scrutiny may also affect the trade-off between equity 
and safety. A secondary aim of this research is to 
explore whether and how different types of selection 
procedures for passenger screening affect equity 
trade-offs. 
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2. Trade-off between Safety and Equity  
 
2.1. Travelers’ Multi-Attribute Utility Model 
 
U.S. travelers have multiple concerns and 
priorities in relation to changing passenger screening 
policies. Although concern for safety is central, 
equity, time, cost, and convenience are also top 
priorities. For instance, a survey of the airline 
industry indicated that removing shoes during 
security screening is second only to high ticket price 
in passenger complaints [3]. However, because a 
policy that helps to increase safety is likely to require 
sacrifices on other objectives, any policy that aims to 
increase aviation safety will require travelers to make 
trade-offs. Importantly, travelers will sacrifice some 
level of equity because of the use of risk-based 
screening in which travelers classified as high risk 
will be selected for a more thorough security check. 
The selection not only creates additional 
inconvenience for some travelers but also agitates 
others because travelers may perceive such selection 
as being an instance of the violation of the 
constitution principle of equal protection. These 
undesirable consequences can undermine public 
acceptance and confidence in the system, leading to 
possible withdrawal of highly effective security 
procedures.  
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) [4] 
provides an appropriate framework to quantify 
travelers’ trade-offs among conflicting objectives, 
including safety, in the context of airport security. 
MAUT prescribes a model to compare alternative 
screening policies that accounts for travelers’ concern 
for multiple conflicting objectives. Given U.S. 
passenger diversity, one would expect individual 
differences in multi-attribute utility models among 
individual travelers. We apply MAUT to characterize 
and quantify the trade-off between safety and four 
other conflicting objectives that are of concern to 
U.S. travelers. The mathematical expression of the 
additive model is U(X1, X2,…, Xn) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖) 
where “U” is the multi-attribute utility of the 
passenger screening policy to the traveler; the capital 
“Xi” represents the measurable attribute of an 
objective; note that multiple Xi’s represent multiple 
(conflicting) attributes; the lower case “xi” indicates 
the levels of the respective attributes; the “ui” 
represents the utility functions of each attribute; and 
“wi” are scaling constants. The degree that an 
individual passenger is concerned about safety is 
characterized by a scaling constant “wi” with respect 
to the objective “Xi”—“Maximizing Safety”. 
Because the values of the scaling constants sum to 
1.0, the scaling constant for the objective 
“Maximizing Safety” is the relative weight of safety 
in the model. This value depends in part on the 
ranges of the measureable attributes representing the 
objectives. In the present study, scaling constants 
(weights) are assessed from individual pairwise 
choices varying in safety and each of the other 
objectives specified in the model.  
In the context of airport security, we identified 
five relevant objectives that travelers are likely to 
care about. These five objectives are: maximizing 
equity, minimizing wait time, maximizing safety, 
maximizing convenience, and minimizing cost. The 
first three objectives are adopted from Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser [5] whereas the latter two are included for 
completeness. Importantly, these objectives are 
conflicting with each other in the sense that an 
increase in the level of achievement in one objective 
generally requires a decrease in the achievement in 
the other objectives. For instance, a safer security 
procedure that requires more stringent screening and 
security examination undoubtedly increases the time 
it takes travelers to complete their security check, and 
increases the cost and inconvenience. Likewise, a 
safer screening procedure may compromise the 
principle of equal protection. In our 
conceptualization, a risk-based procedure that 
identifies and selects high-risk passengers for 
additional security check is safer than a procedure 
that screens passengers identically. Clearly, security 
resources are limited, and the majority of passengers 
have a very low security risk. Thus, allocating scarce 
resources to low risk passengers is unwise, and 
concentrating more resources on high-risk passengers 
is a more effective approach. Consequently, a safer 
security screening may violate the principle of equal 
protection because only a subset of passengers suffer 
the consequence of enhanced screening. Passengers 
may not have equal chances of selection for enhanced 
screening, thus creating a conflict that requires a 
trade-off between safety and equity.    
To elicit trade-offs involving safety and the 
other four objectives, we designed a hypothetical 
decision dilemma in which respondents were asked to 
make binary choices requiring a trade-off for a high 
level of safety by giving up some level of 
achievement in other objectives, including cost, time, 
convenience, and equity. Specifically, respondents 
choose between two airlines for a vacation flight. The 
two airlines are identical in all aspects, including 3 of 
the 5 attributes, but they differ specifically on exactly 
two of the five attributes, thus requiring respondents 
to make a trade-off between these two attributes. 
Using this decision dilemma, we elicited an estimate 
of how much travelers were willing to sacrifice in 
terms of equity, money, time, and convenience to 
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achieve a higher level of safety. The trade-offs for 
safety are referred to as safety premiums to reflect the 
additional costs that travelers are willing to incur to 
make air travel safer. From the elicited safety 
premiums, we compute scaling parameters (weights) 
for safety in the MAU model. We define the concept 
safety weight as the relative importance of safety 
with respect to our MAU model. 
 
2.2. Changes in Safety Scaling Parameters 
 
Because the safety premiums are contingent 
upon how travelers prioritize safety with respect to 
other attributes, such as time, money, equity, and 
convenience, it is expected that the relative weight 
for safety changes in response to commercial aviation 
events, such as accidents or terror attacks. Indeed, it 
is expected that the weight for equal protection is 
weaker when concern for safety is high compared to 
when it is low [5, 6]. The current research attempts to 
directly address this prediction by using an actual 
aviation incident to conduct a natural longitudinal 
experiment to examine how preference for safety and 
equity change over time. We utilize the occurrence of 
the disappearance of the Malaysian Flight 370 to 
study whether and how the relative importance of 
safety changes as the incident unfolds.  
The Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (MH370) was 
a scheduled international flight from Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia to Beijing, China on March 8th 2014. The 
flight disappeared less than an hour after taking off 
from Kuala Lumpur, carrying 227 passengers from 
15 countries. The disappearance of the aircraft has 
launched a multinational search, but after over 2 
years of extensive search, the aircraft is still missing. 
All crew members and passengers have been 
presumed dead. The MH370 disappearance has 
resulted in extensive media coverage. During the 
search and investigation, several causes of the 
disappearance have been proposed but none has been 
confirmed. As of today, MH370 is still missing.  The 
disappearance of MH 370 presents a rare and unique 
opportunity to examine safety trade-offs. The current 
study utilizes this incident to examine how U.S. 
travelers make trade-offs for safety over a period of 
six weeks after the disappearance of the plane. Every 
week during the 6-week study period, we invited a 
different sample of U.S. travelers to participate in our 
experiment. Figure 1 presents the timeline of the 
event and the points in time that we collected data.  
There are two opposing hypotheses about the 
pattern of trade-off for safety over time. Previous 
research on risk perception in transportation 
accidents suggests a time decay hypothesis [7, 8]. The 
prediction is that travelers are willing to make greater 
sacrifices for safety immediately after the incident 
because of the increased perception of risk to aviation 
safety and security, but the effect is attenuated as the 
incident fades. Several empirical studies provide 
support for this prediction. For example, Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser (2003) who found that compared to pre-
9/11, respondents were more willing to compromise 
their preference for equal protection to achieve a 
higher level of airport safety after 9/11. In addition, 
Sheu [7] found that students who attended a college in 
an island off of mainland Taiwan in which air flights 
and ferries are the only means of transportation 
between the island the mainland showed an increased 
concern over safety in the two weeks after a plane 
crash, and a greater likelihood of traveling by ferry 
despite its greater travel time and inconvenience. 
Additional evidence comes from studies on the 
Tokyo anthrax attack and the Madrid bombing. 
Although both events resulted in civilian deaths (12 
in the subway anthrax attack and 191 in the 
bombing), the reduction in public transportation 
ridership, presumably due to the fear of additional 
attacks, was temporary, disappearing shortly after the 
events [9, 10].  
Conversely it is entirely possible that the 
perception of risk lingers over time, causing travelers 
to continuously worry about their travel safety due to 
intense media coverage of the event and the 
surrounding uncertainty. This effect can be further 
exacerbated as terrorism remains a possible cause for 
the incident, since the investigation has not 
concluded.  Following this logic, safety weights are 
expected to stay high for an extended period of time. 
Support for this possibility comes from a study by 
Prager and colleagues [11] who showed that there was 
a significant drop in subway ridership in London 
after the bombing attacks that killed 39 people. The 
reduction in ridership persisted for months, and there 
was evidence showing that the reduction may have 
continued for almost a year. In a recent study on risk 
perception after the collision between two 
Washington DC’s Metrorail trains, Wernstedt and 
Murray-Tuite [12] found evidence contradicting the 
time decay hypothesis. In particular, they found a 
positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the passage of time and safety concerns.  
Given these contradictory predictions and the 
uniqueness of the MH370 incident, we explore both 
hypotheses. Because the weights in the MAU model 
are dependent and constrained to sum to 1.0, an 
increase in safety weight implies a decrease in the 
weight for at least one other objective. Thus, we also 
explore how weights for other attributes, including 
time, money, convenience, and equity, change over 
time. 
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     Figure 1. Timeline of the MH370 disappearance and data collection prior to and after the disappearance.  
 
 
2.2. Concern for Equity is Malleable  
 
Because previous airport security policies have 
been rejected on the grounds that they violate the 
constitutional principle of equal protection, 
understanding preference for equity offers valuable 
insights into the design and implementation of new 
policies that aim to increase aviation safety and 
airport security. Indeed, a particularly interesting 
question is how different screening alternatives may 
affect preference for equity. The question is 
motivated by the fact that the TSA has experimented 
with various screening procedures. The criminology 
literature suggests that public support for legal 
authorities is conditional on the perception of the 
fairness of the procedure by which a legal measure is 
implemented—a concept known as procedural justice 
[13]. In the airport security context, the notion of 
procedural justice suggests that public support for a 
selective security screening policy may largely 
depend on the characteristics of the procedure that 
selects passengers for additional scrutiny. In other 
words, the notion of procedural justice implies that 
equity values depend on perceptions of procedural 
fairness in passenger screening measures 
implemented by the TSA. When a fair procedure is 
used and is perceived as such, travelers may not have 
to compromise their safety priority to accommodate 
their preference for an equitable screening. However, 
when an unfair procedure is used, travelers are 
expected to make greater trade-offs to protect their 
preference for equity, potentially reducing their 
safety priority.  
Various security selection procedures have 
potential implications for the trade-offs involving 
equity. For example, although the explicit act of 
profiling passengers based on race, ethnicity, age, 
and sex is not permitted by law, the use of profiling 
manifests in many facets of past and current security 
programs. Individuals may be selected for particular 
high risk lists based on personal characteristics and 
history that may involve protected classes and invoke 
the possibility of profiling. Behavioral screening is 
another option with unknown efficacy. The rationale 
behind this technique is that potential terrorists who 
disguise themselves as regular air travelers may 
express certain emotional responses such as anxiety, 
fear, and distress. Through extensive training, 
behavioral detection officers are believed to be able 
to detect micro changes in the facial expression of 
these potential terrorists, and apprehend these 
suspects before they can execute their action plans. A 
third alternative is randomized security screening. A 
limited version of randomized screening has been 
implemented for passengers who currently participate 
in the Trusted Travel Program. Recall that passengers 
who sign up for this program undergo an expedited 
screening. However, TSA officers still randomly 
select some of these travelers for additional 
screening.  
Clearly, even though these procedures result in 
the same outcome such that some individuals are 
singled out for additional scrutiny more frequently 
than others, they have unique procedural 
characteristics that distinguish them from each other. 
The possible differences in the procedural 
characteristics can constitute unique judgmental and 
behavioral reactions to each of these procedures; 
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hence, trade-offs for equity are possibly very 
different under different procedures. Surprisingly, 
this empirical research question has largely remained 
unexamined. The current study is designed to address 
this research gap by comparing how different 
selective screening procedures can influence trade-
offs involving equity. In particular, we expect that 
equity receives more weight under the profiling-
based selection procedure and under the behavioral 
selection procedure compared to the randomized 
selection. We hypothesize that the former two 
procedures result in greater concern for equal 
protection due to subjective perceptions of fairness. 
While random selection necessarily results in 
outcome inequity, we expect travelers to perceive 
random screening high in procedural fairness.  
 
3. Method 
 
3.1 Study Overview 
 
In November 2013, we conducted the first 
experiment to examine preference for equity in the 
context of airport security, several months prior to the 
MH370 incident. On March 8th 2014 news about the 
disappearance of the MH370 first emerged, and we 
began collecting additional data to examine how 
preference for safety changed after the occurrence of 
a safety-related aviation incident. The design, 
materials, and procedure were the same for the pre- 
and post-MH370 studies. Thus, data collected prior to 
the MH370 disappearance serve as the baseline 
measure, and data collected after March 8th 2014 
allowed us to examine how relative weights for 
safety changed over time. During each of the next six 
consecutive weeks, we recruited a different sample to 
participate in our study (see Figure 1 for the 
timeline). Thus, the study is a cross-sectional 
longitudinal natural experiment (see Figure 1 for the 
timeline). All respondents are Mechanical Turk 
workers. Previous studies have shown that Turk 
samples are generally more representative than other 
non-probability samples [14, 15, 16]. Demographic 
information, including sex, age, self-reported 
political preference, and frequency of flight for each 
panel is presented in Table 1.  
Each experiment began with a four-minute video 
describing the study, including a detailed explanation 
of the five objectives, as well as a careful description 
of the task they were going to complete. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of three possible 
selection procedures for the two-stage screening, i.e.,  
randomization, behavioral indicators, or demographic 
profiling. Respondents completed ten pairwise trade-
off assessments derived from selecting all possible 
pairs of the five objectives. The order of the trade-off 
assessments was randomized. In each of the 
assessments, respondents were offered two 
alternative screening policies (varying on two 
attributes only) and were asked to indicate their 
preferred option or indifference. 
. 
3.2 Objective Definitions 
 
The five objectives specified in our MAU model 
are maximizing safety, equity, and convenience and 
minimizing time and cost. Each of these objectives 
was operationalized with a measureable attribute. 
Cost is defined as the screening fee that passengers 
pay per flight. Wait time is defined as the length of 
time in minutes that passengers, on average, had to 
wait to complete security screening. Convenience is 
defined as the proportion of passengers without 
contraband mistakenly singled out for further 
scrutiny. These false alarms are resolved by having 
these (misclassified) passengers undergo a more 
thorough screening, i.e. they have to take off their 
shoes, remove their jackets, remove their laptops, etc. 
Safety is defined as the miss rate, the proportion of 
passengers with contraband boarding a plane without 
being detected during screening. The “safety” 
attribute, as defined here, is probabilistically related 
to the notion of “safety” often used in the colloquial 
sense. The motivation for this definition stems from 
the fact that the higher the number of people who are 
carrying contraband on board, the higher the 
probability that passengers experience catastrophic 
security incidents. Equal protection is operationalized 
as the level of equity in the screening process. 
Specifically, the low equity policies alternative is a 
two-stage screening in which all travelers undergo a 
quick screening but some of them will be selected for 
an additional more thorough screening. The high 
equity alternative screening policy alternative 
involves a one-stage procedure that has all passengers 
undergo the same thorough security screening. The 
two-stage screening is considered less equitable than 
the one-stage screening.  
 
3.3 Trade-off Elicitation 
 
We applied an indifference procedure to quantify 
the values at which respondents were willing to 
sacrifice for safety. Respondents were asked to 
choose their preferred airline from a series of binary 
choices. The general approach was to discover a pair 
of screening alternatives varying on two attributes 
that respondents were indifferent. This assessment 
allowed for calculation of safety premiums and  
1506
  
Table 1. Panel characteristics 
 
  
relative weights for the MAU model. We 
illustrate the indifference procedure in Figure 2. The 
horizontal axis represents the two fixed levels of 
safety whereas the vertical axis represents levels of 
cost. A lower level of cost and higher level of safety 
are preferred. The letters represent the set of binary 
choices in three trials in which choice A is fixed and 
choice B is varied. In this graphical presentation, we 
consider the trade-off between safety and cost 
represented in a series of three binary choice trials 
with two options, A and B. The level of safety for A 
is low, and the cost associated with this screening is 
also low. On the other hand, option B offers a more 
expensive screening cost but the level of safety is 
higher.  
Respondents were asked to choose either A or 
B1 in the first trial. The choice of option B1 suggests 
people prefer safety over cost in this particular trade-
off, whereas the choice of option A suggests 
otherwise. Since our goal was to elicit respondents’ 
indifference point, the choice of B1 implies that the 
cost associated with this option should be higher, and 
the choice of A implies that the cost of B1 should be 
lower. Thus, the cost in option B1 was adjusted to B2 
> B1 if respondents chose B1, or B3 < B1 if A was 
chosen assuming the cost for A was fixed. The same 
logic was applied in the next trial, which resulted in 
four possible positions for option B. The procedure 
was repeated until respondents indicated they were 
indifferent between the two options. The difference 
in cost between A and B in the indifference trial is 
the safety premium. This value is interpreted as the  
 
premium that people are willing to sacrifice for 
safety. 
 
 
Figure 2. Indifference methodology 
 
If a respondent did not select the “indifference” 
option in any of the three trials, their safety premium 
was bounded using inequalities determined from the 
three trials. We set the midpoint value of the bounded 
range as the safety premium for respondents who did 
not indicate indifference at any three trials. For 
respondents who consistently chose the higher cost 
option for all 3 choices, we set the safety premium to 
be twice as large as the cost in the third trial. Other 
pairs of trade-offs followed the same logic.  
 
 
 
 
Baseline (n = 222) Time 1 (n = 168) Time 2 (n = 176) Time 3 n(170) Time 4 (n = 166) Time 5 (n = 172) Time 6 (n = 174)
Sex
female 47.748% 63.095% 60.227% 62.353% 63.855% 61.628% 60.920%
Ethnicity
African Americans 6.306% 4.762% 7.386% 7.059% 9.036% 4.651% 6.322%
Asian Americans 7.658% 7.143% 4.545% 3.529% 4.819% 4.070% 3.448%
Hispanic Orignis 4.054% 4.167% 7.386% 7.647% 4.217% 3.488% 5.172%
Native Americans 0.000% 0.000% 0.568% 0.588% 0.000% 1.163% 0.000%
Other 0.901% 0.595% 2.841% 4.118% 0.602% 2.326% 1.149%
Pacific Islanders 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.581% 0.575%
Caucasians 81.081% 83.333% 77.273% 77.059% 81.325% 83.721% 83.333%
None 14.865% 10.119% 13.068% 11.765% 6.024% 7.558% 9.770%
1 to 3 times 51.802% 44.048% 46.591% 47.059% 42.771% 52.907% 39.655%
4 to 6 times 20.721% 21.429% 23.864% 28.824% 28.313% 23.837% 32.184%
More than 6 12.613% 24.405% 16.477% 12.353% 22.892% 15.698% 18.391%
# Flights last 4 
years
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3.4 Screening Procedure Manipulation  
 
To examine the effect of alternative screening 
procedures on equity premiums (and relative 
weights), we manipulated the selection procedure in 
the two-stage screening for choice tasks involving 
variation in equity. Specifically, the one-stage 
screening requires that every air traveler is screened 
in the same manner. The two-stage screening requires 
an initial screening of all travelers (less intrusive than 
the one-stage screening). However, certain 
passengers are selected for additional, more thorough 
screening. The two-stage screening is presumed to be 
less equitable than the one-stage screening. The focus 
of the manipulation is how the passengers are 
selected for additional scrutiny in the two-stage 
screening. Air travelers are selected as a result of one 
of the following procedures: random process, 
behavioral selection, or demographic profiling. 
Randomized selection is defined as the random 
selection of passengers based on a computer 
algorithm. Behavioral selection uses trained TSA 
officers to identify passengers based on suspicious 
behavioral indicators, such as perceived fear or stress. 
Demographic profiling selects passengers based on 
their age, race, sex, and/or national origin. 
 
4. Results 
 
We first compute weights for each of the five 
objectives by assuming linear utility functions for all 
5 attributes. Although we elicited weight ratios for all 
10 attribute pairs, any four ratios involving all 5 
attributes would yield an estimate of the scaling 
parameters (relative weights) for all five attributes. 
We chose to use the four assessments involving per 
flight cost to compute relative weights, consistent 
with the “pricing out” method by Keeney and others 
[17]. Examinations of the distributions revealed non-
normality, suggesting a violation of one of the 
assumptions in parametric statistics. Thus, we 
conducted all of the analyses using non-parametric 
statistics. First, Kruskal-Wallis, a non-parametric 
version of one-way ANOVA, was used to detect 
changes in distributions of weights over time. 
Follow-up Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) tests, a non-
parametric version of t-test, were used to compare 
different pairs of time points. Second, the same tests 
were used to compare the effects of the experimental 
groups. In the next sections, we present descriptive 
results graphically, followed by statistical tests.  
 
 
 
 
4.1 The Effect of MH370 on Preference for Safety  
 
Figure 3 presents the cumulative distributions of 
weights for each of the five attributes over time. In 
each of the five plots, each curve represents the 
distribution of weight at a particular point in time 
when the data were collected. The horizontal axis in 
each plot represents the value of weights for a 
particular objective while the vertical axis is the 
cumulative percentage. The curves to the lower right 
(following disappearance of MH370) do not cross the 
curves to the upper left (prior to the disappearance of 
MH370). Consequently, safety was judged as being 
relatively more important following loss of MH370 
compared to the baseline obtained prior to the 
MH370 loss. Stated differently, respondents 
following loss of MH370 (lower curves), were 
willing to make greater sacrifices for safety, i.e. a 
greater safety premium, than respondents prior to the 
MH370 disappearance (higher curves). Visual 
inspection suggests a clear effect of the 
disappearance of the MH370. In particular, safety has 
received more weight after the disappearance. 
Unexpectedly, weight for convenience also increased 
after the disappearance of MH370. On the other 
hand, relative weights for time, money, and equity all 
decreased. Interestingly, the shifts in weight 
distributions appear from the very first assessment 
following the MH370 disappearance (time 1). In fact, 
there is little variation among the distributions for 
times 1 through 6, as indicated by the similar 
cumulative plots.  
Statistical tests confirmed these visual 
inspections. Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test suggested a 
significant difference among the distributions over 
time across all five objectives: for safety, KW χ2 (6) 
= 84.582, p <. .001; for equity, KW χ2 (6) = 440.607, 
p <. .001; for convenience, KW χ2 (6) = 442.44, p <. 
.001; for time, KW χ2 (6) = 121.293, p <. .001; and 
for money, KW χ2 (6) = 442.80, p <. .001 Followed 
up pairwise comparisons with KS tests and 
Bonferroni correction for type I error suggested the 
significant differences between the baseline and each 
of the time point when data were collected after the 
MH370 disappearance, ps < .01.Comparisons among 
other time points revealed no significant difference.  
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4.2 The Effect of Alternative Screening 
Procedures on Preference for Equity 
 
Our analysis of the effect of secondary screening 
selection procedures was carried out on the combined 
data from the six time periods following the 
disappearance of MH370 only.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative distributions of weights 
 
Equity received higher relative weight in the 
profiling condition and lower relative weight in the 
randomization condition. Follow-up KS tests 
confirmed this observation. There were significant 
difference in the distribution of equity weights 
between the profiling and the randomization 
conditions, D = 0.095, p = .046. The difference 
between the behavioral screening and randomization 
was in the expected direction, but not significant, D = 
0.090, p = .059. There was clearly no significant 
difference between the profiling and the behavioral 
selection conditions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 (cont) 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Utilizing the Malaysian Flight MH370 incident, 
this research examines changes in safety trade-offs. 
Using multi-attribute utility theory, we 
conceptualized and elicited trade-offs for safety 
within a broad value system involving five multiple 
and conflicting objectives, and modeled how the 
trade-off for safety changed as a result of the MH370 
incident. While the time decay hypothesis suggests a 
gradual attenuation of safety weight as the event 
fades, our data does not provide empirical support for 
this prediction. In fact, the results suggest a relatively 
enduring effect of the incident on safety concerns. 
Indeed, the weight for safety was relatively constant 
over a period of six weeks after the incident had 
occurred. Importantly, the values of safety elicited 
after the incident were significantly larger than the 
baseline value measured before the incident, 
suggesting that air travelers were willing to make 
greater sacrifices for safety after the event. As 
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expected, weights for (some) other objectives 
decreased as the relative weight for safety increased, 
lending further support for the finding. To our 
awareness, this is one of the first (and few) studies 
that tracks and measures changes in trade-offs for 
safety over time, and examines the effect of a real-
world event on travelers’ trade-offs. 
The finding that safety concerns were relatively 
constant over an extended period of time (following 
disappearance of MH370) was surprising, given the 
robust empirical support for the time decay 
hypothesis in the literature on traffic accident [7]. 
Nevertheless, evidence against the time decay 
hypothesis has also been reported in other studies. 
For example, Wernstedt and Murray-Tuite [12] used 
survey data to model trade-offs for safety after the 
collision of two DC Metrorail’s trains. Researchers 
found a significant and positive relationship between 
trade-offs for safety and time, which suggests that 
passengers valued safety more as the event faded. 
However, the lack of a baseline measure limited their 
conclusions. In contrast, we utilized a baseline 
measure in our experiment, which made it 
experimentally feasible to examine the effect of an 
ambiguous incident on trade-offs involving safety. 
Secondly, whereas researchers in the previous study 
used statistical models to infer safety weights, we 
elicited safety trade-offs in this study. Thus, relative 
safety weights, as elicited in this study, are a 
reflection of respondents’ subjective judgments rather 
than statistical parameters.  
Importantly, whereas the previous study 
measured preference (or concern) for safety from 
respondents who were at least indirectly affected by 
the collision, we obtained similar results by recruiting 
respondents who were not affected by the incident. 
When there are immediate safety risks, it is perhaps 
not surprising that people are willing to make greater 
sacrifices for safety due to the objective risk. 
However, we found that when safety risks are not 
immediate (indeed they were quite remote), people 
are also willing to make greater trade-offs for safety, 
suggesting the importance of risk perception in 
behavioral responses after extreme disaster incidents. 
Similar to an increase in relative safety weight, 
respondents also indicated a greater weight for 
convenience after the incident. One possible 
interpretation for the increasing importance of 
convenience is changes in airport security procedures 
following the MH370 incident, which possibly 
elevated the level of inconvenience experienced by 
travelers. It follows that respondents would thus put a 
greater premium on convenience following the 
incident. While there was little actual change in 
security procedures immediately following the loss of 
MH370, it is possible that travelers expected an 
increase in inconvenience after the incident. An 
alternative, and perhaps more plausible account 
involves respondents’ expectancy for more security 
inconvenience. Recall that terrorism was not ruled 
out as one of the possible causes of the incident 
during the study period. Thus, it is reasonable to 
believe that respondents may have expected more 
airport security hassles, and this could account for an 
increased weight for convenience following the loss 
of MH370. Certainly, this finding and interpretation 
should be explored further.   
Because of the premium placed on equity, 
several airport security measures have been delayed 
or discontinued. Understanding travelers’ concern for 
equity in the context of airport security is important. 
We found that different risk-based screening 
procedures produce different effects on the relative 
weight for equity. The notion of procedural fairness 
implies that the perceptions of the (security) 
procedure that legal authorities (e.g., the TSA) apply 
are more important than the outcome of the 
procedure. Thus, by controlling for the effectiveness 
and outcome of the selective security screening, we 
focused on the procedural characteristics of selecting 
passengers for further security checks. We found that 
air travelers were willing to make greater sacrifices to 
avoid a procedure that selects passengers based on 
their demographic profiles compared to procedures 
that single out travelers based on their behavioral 
expression characteristics or a randomized process. 
These results offer valuable insights regarding the use 
of different airport security screening procedures. For 
instance, even if the use of profiling results in greater 
effectiveness compared to behavioral selection and/or 
randomization, this benefit must be weighed against 
the risk of public rejection due to concerns about 
equal protection. 
Most decisions involve multiple objectives, and 
these objectives are often conflicting, requiring 
decision makers to make difficult trade-offs. The 
decision to select and adopt airport security policy to 
make air traveler safer is not an exception. The TSA, 
airport authorities, and commercial airlines need to 
consider how various characteristics of a proposed 
policy may hinder or promote values about which air 
travelers are deeply concerned. Importantly, 
understanding how travelers make trade-offs for 
various policy attributes will provide critical insights 
for those stakeholders to consider and (re)design 
proposed security initiatives in a manner that the 
traveling public will find useful, effective, and 
acceptable. The current study makes this approach 
feasible by 1) providing new insights on how 
travelers value safety when there is an aviation safety 
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incident and 2) suggesting that preference for equity, 
which is inversely related to safety, is contingent 
upon the risk-based screening measure used.  
Ultimately, the success of a particular security 
policy depends on how it is perceived with respect to 
public concerns and values that may not be directly 
related to the effectiveness or efficiency of the policy 
under consideration. Assessing public trade-offs 
related to deeply held personal values such as safety 
and equal protection (equity), therefore, is a 
potentially useful tool to better understand the 
complexity of public values essential to formulating 
sensible and effective security policies.  
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